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Introduction
Bare plurals across languages can be associated with existential quantificational force. In the neo-Carlsonian account of Chierchia (1998) , there are two distinct sources for this. One is the low ranked ∃-type shift of Partee (1986) , which comes into play when the higher ranked nom and iota are unavailable. The other is the basic kind level meaning for bare plurals, where ∃ force comes into existence as a result of sort-adjustment by the rule of Derived Kind Predication (DKP), in the spirit of Carlson (1977) . Noun phrases shifted by ∃ are marked by the ability to take scope over other operators. Noun phrases that tap into DKP are characterized by obligatory narrow scope with respect to other operators. This paper re-examines both sources of existential force and presents a new perspective on them.
Canonically, bare plurals allow reference to kinds but there are some that do not. ∃-type shift is posited by Chierchia for bare plurals that are not kind denoting. In this paper, a hitherto overlooked distinction among such bare purals is noted. It is shown that while one set indeed shows scopal flexibility, as expected under Chierchia's analysis, the other set does not. It is argued that allowing ∃-type shift for even the first set is not viable when a larger set of facts is taken into account. Alternative ways of achieving the same effects are proposed, to compensate for eliminating ∃-type shift from the set of covert options available to bare plurals.
The paper then turns to the more familiar class of bare plurals, those for which Chierchia maintains a kind-based approach and uses DKP to obtain existential readings. New diagnostics are presented to show that the narrow scope existential readings imputed to bare plurals are not sufficient to capture the full range of their behavior. In order to accommodate these new facts, ∃ quantification is eliminated from DKP. Bare plurals in episodic contexts are argued to refer to a unique maximal entity, defined over a widened domain. The so-called ∃ readings are claimed to be "representative group readings" of such maximal entities.
The end result of the investigation, then, is to do away with both sources of ∃ force for bare plurals. Doing away with ∃-type shift pushes Chierchia's original formulation of the hierarchy of covert type shifts to its logical limits, where only the two operations that he classifies as meaning preserving are available in natural language. Doing away with ∃ quantification in DKP further delinks the alignment between bare plurals and indefinites in favor of aligning bare plurals with definites, pushing further a view proposed in Dayal 2004 . Treating bare plurals as involving no quantification of any kind, as de facto definites, appears quite radical. But I build up to this conclusion incrementally, inviting the reader to go along with me as far as they can. The hope is that even if no part of the new proposal proves persuasive, the empirical motivations behind it will re-energize the bearers of the standard view to look at an old problem from a new angle.
I introduce in section 2 the theoretical framework of Chierchia (1998) , within which I develop my account of bare plurals. In section 3, I draw attention to a distinction among bare plurals that do not denote kinds, and show why they are problematic for current accounts. In section 4, I capture the distinction by modifying the presuppositions associated with kind formation and by eliminating ∃-type shift from the grammar. In section 5, I look at kind denoting bare plurals and, on the basis of new data, argue against incorporating ∃ in DKP and in favor of treating bare plurals as definites over a widened domain. In section 6, I consider some issues raised by the shift in perspective argued for and suggest lines for further inquiry.
Bare plurals in Chierchia's Neo-Carlsonian approach
Chierchia (1998) put on the research agenda the goal of developing a theory of cross-linguistic variation in the domain of noun phrases. The impact of this paper has been phenomenal and the response to it has transformed the empirical landscape, informing and deepening our understanding of the interpretive possibilities available across languages. In this section I will present the key ingredients of his theory, making explicit the background against which I will undertake the reanalysis of bare plurals.
The basic premise of the neo-Carlsonian position is that bare plurals refer to kinds, not only in the case of kind-level predication but also in the case of object-level predication, as originally proposed in Carlson (1977) . Their quantificational force, however, is governed by the same principles that Lewis (1975) , Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982) demonstrated govern the quantificational force of regular indefinites.
1 In a generic statement, for example, a bare plural can have either (quasi) ∀ force or ∃ force, depending on whether it is interpreted in the restrictor or the nuclear scope. In an episodic statement, which does not have a tripartite logical structure, bare plurals are necessarily mapped into the nuclear scope and so have ∃ force.
Chierchia takes this general approach a step further and proposes a cross-linguistic theory of noun phrase variation. Within the general perspective of flexible types (Partee 1986) , he admits three basic operations for turning an NP with a predicative meaning (type <e,t>) into an argument (type <e> or <<e,t>t>), nom, iota and ∃:
1 Proponents of the ambiguity approach (Wilkinson 1991 , Gerstner-Link and Krifka 1993 and Diesing 1992 , among others) take bare plurals to refer to kinds when they serve as arguments of kind-level predicates and to ordinary individuals when they serve as arguments of object-level predicates. The ambiguity approach and the neo-Carlsonian approach converge, however, on the need for a flexible mapping of noun phrases into the logical structure.
For a comparison of the two approaches, see Krifka et al. (1995) and Dayal (2011a) , in addition to the references mentioned here.
(1) a. iota: λP ιP s , if there exists a unique maximal entity in P, undefined otherwise. (Chierchia 1998: 346) b. nom: For any property P and world/situation s, ⋂ P = λs ιP s , if λs ιP s is in K, undefined otherwise where P s is the extension of P in s and K is the set of kinds. (Chierchia 1998: 350-351) c. ∃: λP λQ ∃x [P(x) ⋀ Q(x)] (Chierchia 1998: 359) Of these, Chierchia considers the first two meaning preserving, in the sense that they map a predicate into an entity without introducing quantificational complexity. The first is iota which picks out the unique maximal entity in the extension of the predicate at the relevant situation, if there is one, and is undefined otherwise (Sharvy 1980) . In English, this shift has a lexical exponent the, but in many languages it is a covert type shift. Nom, the kind forming operator of Chierchia (1984) , is a function from indices to the maximal entity that is in the extension of the predicate at that index -that is, it yields the unique maximal entity that instantiates the kind at the index. Nom is defined to yield falsity rather than presupposition failure at indices where the extension of the predicate is empty. It is, however, a partial function because it is undefined for predicates that do not fit the concept of a kind: "not all individual concepts are going to be kinds.
Only those that identify classes of objects with a sufficiently regular function and/or behavior will qualify. Moreover, kinds…will generally have a plurality of instances (even though sometimes they may have just one or none). But something that is necessarily instantiated by just one individual (e.g., the individual concept or transworld line associated with Gennaro Chierchia) would not qualify as a kind" (Chierchia 1998: 350) . The third type-shift ∃, from Partee (1986) , not only turns a predicative expression into an argument, it also introduces ∃ quantificational force. Since this yields an expression of the generalized quantifier type, it can interact scopally with other scopal expressions. Unlike the first two operations, ∃ is a total function.
In Chierchia's system these possibilities are constrained by two principles specific to type shifts (2a,b) and a third general constraint of economy in grammar (2c).
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(2) a. Ranking: nom > {iota, ∃} to be revised (cf. 13) b. Blocking Principle: ('Type Shifting as Last Resort'):
For any type shifting operation π and any X:
if there is a determiner D such that for any set X in its domain,
. (Chierchia 1998: 360) c. Avoid structure: Apply SHIFT at the earliest possible level. (Chierchia 1998: 393) Finally, there is the rule of DKP which mediates between a kind denoting term and a predicate of objects, a repair operation of sorts (3). It first takes the extension of the kind at an index defined as in (4), converts it into a predicate of objects, and ∃ binds into this predicate (3). Since this ∃ is introduced at the point where the sort adjustment is required, it ensures obligatory narrow scope for its operand: 2 Chierchia's stance on the ranking of covert type shifts has to be gleaned from two separate discussions. The distinction between languages with and without determiners leads him to rank iota and ∃ at par (Chierchia 1998: 360-61) . The distinction between English kind denoting and non-kind denoting bare plurals leads him to rank nom above ∃ (Chierchia 1998: 374) . The two positions are actually inconsistent, as pointed out in Dayal (1999 Dayal ( , 2004 . Some of the arguments from there are used to motivate the revision of (2a) in (13).
(3) Derived Kind Predication Rule (DKP):
If P applies to objects and k denotes a kind, (Chierchia 1998: 364) (4) PRED ( ∪ ):
where d s is the plural individual that comprises all of the atomic members of the kind k. (Chierchia 1998: 350) With this much background, we can demonstrate how the theory captures the core facts related to bare plurals in two languages, English and Hindi. These two languages share the property of encoding number sensitivity in the nominal system while differing on the existence of 
Since evolve is a kind level predicate, and the predicates dogs and wolves have the requisite intensionality, nom turns them into arguments which can be fed into the verb meaning directly.
In the case of arise, which is an object-level predicate in a characterizing sentence, we have a tripartite structure and depending on what goes into the restrictor of the GEN operator, we get distinct truth conditions for the bare plural. (6b) uses PRED to shift the type of the bare plural from kind to predicate and generically bind it. It says of typhoons in general that they arise in this part of the Pacific. In (6b') the bare plural is mapped into the nuclear scope and serves as the argument of the verb arise. Since arise cannot hold of the kind, only of instantiations of the kind, DKP comes into play. (6b') says that it is generally true of all contextually relevant situations involving this part of the Pacific, situations in which the climactic conditions are conducive, that there are typhoons that arise. Similarly, in the case of the episodic statement in (5c), DKP negotiates the relationship between an object-level predicate and a kind level argument, as shown in (6c).
Since we will be focusing on episodic contexts in this paper, it is worth noting that the truth conditions associated with (6c) are the same as those of a corresponding statement with an overt indefinite. However, a difference shows up in scopal contexts. Take, for example, the negative statements in (7), under the LF where the bare plural/indefinite outscopes negation:
4 I assume that the situation variable in episodic statements is indexical, rather than existentially bound, though nothing of relevance to the issues discussed here rides on this.
(7) a. Dogs are not barking. 
Since the bare plural is individual denoting (type <s, e>), it gets lowered into the argument position of the negative predicate. When DKP adjusts the mismatch between barking and ⋂ dogs, ∃ enters into the derivation, necessarily below negation. The regular indefinite, on the other hand, is a generalized quantifier, which means that it enters into an operator-variable relation with its trace and therefore has scope over negation. Appealing to reference to kinds for bare plurals and to a generalized quantifier meaning for indefinites thus yields the radically different truth conditions observed in such cases.
We see, then, that Chierchia's basic system preserves the original insights of Carlson's account, accommodating for advances in our understanding of external sources of quantificational force for indefinites (see also Carlson 1989 on this) . Briefly put, the key insight is that the semantic type of the bare plural ensures that it will always be interpreted closest to the verb, but its sort forces ∃ to be introduced at the level of the mismatch, ie at V, below any other operator.
We now turn to those aspects of interpretation that are specific to Chierchia's system: namely the blocking principle, ranking and economy (cf. 2). We start with the fact that bare plurals in English do not admit definite readings (10a), while those in Hindi do (10b):
(10) a. Some children i came in. Children *i sat down.
b. kuch bacce i andar aaye. bacce i baiTh gaye.
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Some children inside came children sit went 'Some children came in. The children sat down.'
The explanation for this difference follows straightforwardly from blocking. Since iota is lexicalized in English, the definite plural must be used in this context and covert type shift for the bare plural via iota is ruled out. Since Hindi does not have a lexical determiner, the bare plural is free to shift via iota. This seems to be generally representative of languages with and without determiners and thus seems to be a welcome prediction of the theory (but see Dayal in prep) .
The ranking of type shifts becomes important when we turn to English bare plurals that do not denote kinds. They differ from kind terms in allowing wide scope over negation:
(11) a. Parts of this machine are not new.
Of such NPs, Carlson (1977) notes that they refer "to a FINITE set of things, things that must exist at a certain time in a given world" (emphasis his -pg. 196). As such, they do not display the kind of intensionality associated with kind terms. For Chierchia, this means that such bare plurals are not in the domain of nom. Since iota is lexically blocked by the, the bare plural now 5 T is a retroflex voiceless stop, d is a dental stop, h following a stop indicates aspiration.
shifts via the low-ranked ∃ type shift and predictably displays the same scopal flexibility that characterizes regular indefinites.
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As pointed out in Dayal (1999 Dayal ( , 2004 Chierchia argues that some is not a lexical exponent of ∃, unlike a, which is. Thus it does not block the application of ∃ here. Bare singulars are ruled out because they are not in the domain of nom and iota and ∃ are lexically blocked. Crucial to the distinction between some and a is that only the latter lends itself to binding by a generic operator. 7 The idea that Hindi bare nominals are ambiguous between kind terms and definites, not true indefinites, was first proposed in a joint paper (Porterfield and Srivastav 1988) . The facts generalize beyond Hindi to other typologically unrelated languages such as Russian and Chinese.
On the latter, see also Yang (2001 for the theory is that we do not want bare plurals in such languages to be able to access ∃ type shift. This is accomplished by revising the ranking in the following way: Dayal 2004: 419) I consider this a friendly amendment to Chierchia's system and will adopt it as part of the baseline theory in the rest of this paper.
In this section I have presented the details of Chierchia's system at work, in preparation for the discussion to follow. I now turn to the task of establishing that ∃ type shift is not required in some cases and leads to incorrect predictions in others. This will be followed by arguments for dispensing with the ∃ force built into DKP. While I motivate the revisions on empirical grounds, the revisions themselves bear on the specifics of the theory presented above.
Indexical bare plurals
In this section I will take a closer look at non kind denoting terms, which had received little attention since Carlson's original discussion. They remain under-examined even in the literature that has emerged in response to Chierchia's proposal regarding cross-linguistic variation in the interpretation of noun phrases. I would like to begin though by introducing a terminological change. I will refer to such bare plurals from here on as indexical bare plurals since they 9 N indicates nasalization of the immediately preceding vowel.
typically include some indexical expression. I will continue to refer to standard bare plurals as kind denoting, reminding the reader that Carlson included in the set not only natural/wellestablished kinds such as dogs and wolves, but also novel kinds such as houses with red roofs and yellow windows or dogs with three legs.
Two types of indexical bare plurals
As mentioned in connection with (11), Carlson (1977) Recall that Chierchia's account, as summarized in section 2, is that such bare plurals are ∃ generalized quantifiers because they are shifted to argument type by the low ranked ∃ type shift.
It therefore predicts full convergence between indexical bare plurals and indefinites, but this has been challenged by Van Geenhoven (1999) . One point of difference between the two positions is empirical. While Chierchia argues that such NPs can take wide scope with respect to negation, Van Geenhoven claims wide scope readings to be unavailable. The source of this disagreement, I
believe, is due to a distinction in the class of indexical bare plurals that has so far escaped notice.
The examples in (17) show that indexical bare plurals are not a homogeneous class. Some of them, those in partitive constructions, indeed allow wide scope over negation, and this can be made explicit. This scopal flexibility, however, does not hold generally:
(17) a. Parts of this machine are not new, but parts of it definitely are.
b. # Light bulbs for this lamp I sell but light bulbs for this lamp I don't sell.
While (17a) behaves as predicted by Chierchia, (17b) from Van Geenhoven (1999), is contradictory. This buttresses Van Geenhoven's arguments against Chierchia. Of course, the acceptability of (17a) does not support Van Geenhoven's view that these bare plurals are semantically incorporated indefinites. We can abstract away from scope interactions, and note that there remains a distinction between the two types when we try to use them in statements with incompatible predicates. 12 In (18a)-(18c) there are no other operators, so distinctions having to do with kind terms vs. semantically incorporated indefinites are irrelevant. However, there is a contrast between (18a) and (18b)-(18c). We understand the first clause in (18a) to apply to some parts and the second clause to apply to other parts. The same option is clearly not available to (18b) and (18c), where we apparently interpret all the people/light bulbs to have the first property so that applying the second property leads to contradiction:
(18) a. Parts of this machine are old but parts of it are new.
b. # People in the next room are tired but people in the next room are full of energy.
c. # Light bulbs for this lamp were bought at Home Depot but light bulbs for this lamp were bought at Lowe's.
Given that scopal effects are at the heart of the distinction between type shift by nom and type shift by ∃, this distinction clearly merits further attention. I should note in closing that these facts are equally problematic for both approaches to bare plurals, the neo-Carlsonian approaches that treat such bare plurals as kinds and the ambiguity approaches that treat them as object-level indefinites.
Infelicitous indexical bare plurals
There is a further problem with taking indexical bare plurals to tap into ∃ type shift. Not all bare plurals that are conceptually incompatible with kinds are, in fact, acceptable. The crucial data rests on contrasts in contextually anchored bare plurals of the kind discussed by Condoravdi (1997), those she terms "functional" bare plurals. In addition to her example (19a), I include two others:
(19) a. There was a ghost on campus. Students/The students were afraid.
b. My garden is in shambles. Groundhogs/ The groundhogs eat up whatever I plant.
c. The bus stopped. Passengers/The passengers quickly got off the bus.
I will not be concerned with the particulars of Condoravdi's approach but rather with what her data implies for Chierchia's theory. 13 The bare plurals in (19) pose a challenge because they seem to suggest the operation of iota, rather than ∃. The real problem, however, is that there are structurally parallel sentences such as the ones in (20) where the bare plural appears infelicitous.
That this is not an effect restricted to bridging contexts but is more generally true of indexical bare plurals can be seen in (21), where the contextual grounding is lexically encoded in the modifiers inside the noun phrase:
14 (20) a. I bought a car. The wheels/ *Wheels need to be replaced.
b. John has a rope. The fibers/ *Fibers are made of nylon.
c. Sue visited the ancient monument. She found the stones/ *stones impressive.
13 According to Condoravdi, bare plurals are indefinites that are ambiguous between being weakly and strongly novel. She defines a weakly novel NP as requiring its index to be novel, while presupposing its descriptive content. A strongly novel NP places a requirement that the index be novel, but imposes no conditions on its descriptive content. Her claim is that the novelty condition on the index of bare plurals rules out anaphoric readings for them in contexts such as those in (19), but because they have only a requirement of weak novelty, the descriptive content can be entailed by the context. This results in the observed functional readings. For more details, the reader is referred to Condoravdi's work.
14 I owe (21b) to Ayesha Kidwai (p.c.). c. Sue found the stones/ *stones of the monument impressive.
One might, of course, appeal to the blocking principle to explain this effect, but we would then have a problem showing why the same does not apply to (19). In addition, it would not explain why the ∃ type shift, which does not have any presuppositions associated with it, does not become available once iota is lexically blocked. Once again, it bears emphasizing that the data in (19) to (21) pose a challenge not only for Chierchia's theory but for all current theories of bare plurals.
A proposal: nom and ∃ in a system of ranked type shifts
In this section I will lay out my solution to the problems regarding indexical bare plurals discussed in section 3. The solution turns on two changes that I propose to Chierchia's theory:
one, I extend the scope of Chierchia's kind forming operator nom to include some indexical bare plurals; two, I do away with ∃ as a covert type shift.
Extending the Scope of Nom
I will take as my starting point the surprising infelicity of certain bare plurals discussed above.
The obvious conclusion to draw from the facts is that there are only two covert type shifts in natural language, nom and iota. In languages with definite determiners iota is indeed lexically blocked, as claimed by Chierchia. This entails that if for any reason a bare plural cannot undergo nom, it will simply be unacceptable. We now have to figure out the reason why some indexical bare plurals in English undergo nom, while others do not and are therefore infelicitous.
I start by delinking nom from kind terms. Instead, I build partiality into the function in a somewhat different way. That is, instead of an appeal to the concept of kinds in Chierchia's (1a), repeated here as (22a), I appeal to a notion of proper variation in size, as shown in (22b):
(22) a. nom (Chierchia 1998: 350-351 ):
For any property P and world/situation s, ⋂ P = λs ιP s , if λs ιP s is in K, undefined otherwise where P s is the extension of P in s and K is the set of kinds.
b. nom (revised):
For any property P and world/situation s,
where P s & P s' are the extensions of P in s and s'.
Let us see how this helps us deal with indexical terms. Recall that Chierchia takes kinds to be individual concepts that live in the domain of quantification U, if and only if, they "identify classes of objects with a sufficiently regular function and/or behavior" and "generally have a plurality of instances (even though sometimes they may have just one or none)" (Chierchia 1998: 350 ). As we can see, there is both an appeal to intensionality and an appeal to variation in size in defining the notion of kinds here.
My revision of nom in (22b) preserves the notion of variation in size as integral to nom but it lets in a certain amount of extensionality. Let us consider the requirement of variation in size first.
The idea that number morphology plays a role in licensing kind formation goes back to differences I noted in Dayal (1992) between bare plurals/mass terms and definite singular generics in English and between bare plurals/mass terms and bare singulars in Hindi. There were two conclusions I drew from these comparisons. I located number morphology, rather than definiteness marking, as the locus of the differences since they were maintained across languages with and without determiners. A second conclusion I drew there was that singular morphology would constrain the resulting kind term to singleton instantiation sets. I argued that there were fundamentally two types of operations involved in kind formation: a "plural" kind formation and a "singular" kind formation.
The former is what we have been discussing here: nom is defined on predicates whose extensions vary in size from index to index; it is undefined for singular terms "because the number feature clashes with the presuppositions associated with a kind term" (Dayal 1992: 48 I repeat the crucial contrasts from section 3:
(23) a. There was a ghost on campus. Students (on campus) were afraid.
b. My garden is in shambles. Groundhogs (in my garden) eat up whatever I plant.
c. The bus stopped. Passengers (on the bus) quickly got off the bus.
(24) a. I bought a car. *Wheels (of my car) need to be replaced.
b. This rope is very strong. *Fibers (of this rope) are made of nylon.
c. Sue visited the monument. She found *stones (of the monument) impressive.
A crucial difference between (23) and (24) is in the relationship of the bare plural with the noun it is associated with. Take a given campus. While it is readily possible to accommodate a set of students by the mention of a campus, it is not strictly speaking necessary that there be students for a campus to be considered a campus. Similar considerations apply to buses and passengers or gardens and groundhogs. In each case, if we define a function from a given campus/bus/garden 15 Singular terms, of course, can be interpreted as taxonomic kind terms. Crucially, taxonomic kinds do not allow access to individual members in the way that DKP does for kind terms formed by nom. Since we are focusing on bare plurals in this paper, I will not go into details of singular kind formation, referring the reader to Dayal (1992) and the development of those ideas in Dayal (2004) .
to students/groundhogs/passengers in it, we are likely to end up with different sets at different times, and most likely these sets will be of different sizes.
Turning to (24), we see that the connection between the two nouns is much tighter. A car cannot be considered a (complete) car if it does not have wheels. Similarly, while monuments do not, in and of themselves, entail the existence of stones, a given monument made of stone does: the monument cannot exist if the stones are removed. It is the same with a rope, which cannot exist without its fibers. Another way to express this is to say that the noun which provides the functional pivot (e.g., car, rope, monument) and the bare plural it is functionally related to (e.g., wheels, fibers, stones) are co-extensional. If the function is restricted to indices in which the pivot exists, the cardinality of the predicate denoted by the bare plural will remains constant across all of them.
I am suggesting that the infelicity of the bare plurals in (24) is due to this requirement of variation in size but I am aware that this particular implementation of the intuition may not be precise enough. Ivano Caponigro (p.c.) correctly points out that one can conceive of a given rope as having fewer fibers in one world than in another. If the two ropes count as the "same" rope, (22b) fails in its job (see Heller and Wolter 2011 for relevant discussion). There is, of course, a simple way to take care of this problem. We can tap into the intuition that there is a minimum limit on size. There is no world in which we can conceive of the rope without any fibers, so the presupposition on nom could conceivably be stated as: ∃s P s = ∅. I do not pursue this line here since it does not rule out unacceptable bare singulars, such as the ones in (25a). There are many situations in which the same country does not have a president/monarch so the requirement that there be an index at which the extension of the nominal is empty would be insufficient. It would have to be combined with the requirement of variation in size:
(25) a. The country is flourishing. #President/#Monarch is very popular.
b. The platoon is under attack. Soldiers are being killed.
Another alternative to (22b), suggested by an anonymous reviewer, is to have variation in the instantiation set itself instead of in its size: ∃s ∃s' P s ≠ P s' . This would work as well for the contrast we are interested in, since it would rule out the set in (24) where the bare plurals are coextensional with the pivot of the function. It would also explain cases like (25b) where one might imagine a context in which a platoon is defined in terms of a fixed number of soldiers, but the actual soldiers in a given platoon could change from time to time. The reason I have not adopted this suggestion is that it is not clear to me that the same reasoning would not apply to cars and wheels. After all, the wheels on a typical car get changed several times and yet (24a) is clearly unacceptable, unlike (25b). Furthermore, eliminating reference to size would require a separate explanation for cases like (25a). The function from a given country to its president/monarch yields different (atomic) individuals at different times, but bare singulars are unacceptable. The fact that bare singulars do not seem to undergo nom suggests that rigidity in size is critical.
For the moment, then, I will continue to take (22b) as the appropriate way of constraining nom, though I will return to this question briefly in section 6 (see Dayal in prep for further discussion of the alternatives considered here). To sum up, (22b) allows nom to apply to predicates that do not include a deictic term, i.e. standard kind denoting bare plurals, as in Chierchia's original formulation. It privileges bare plurals over bare singulars which are restricted by number morphology to invariably denote an atomic individual. In the case of indexical bare plurals, it makes a crucial distinction. The deictic expression restricts variation to situations with the contextually salient entity in it, in the actual world or in worlds with counterparts of it. The presupposition of variation makes nom undefined for predicative terms where co-extensionality with the deictic term leads to invariance in size. With iota being lexically blocked, such terms are correctly predicted to be infelicitous if ∃ type shift is not in the set of covert shifts. It should be obvious that even if some variant of (22b), such as the ones we have considered above, were to be adopted instead of (22b), the conclusion would remain valid that the infelicity of indexical bare plurals can only be explained if ∃ type shift is removed from the equation.
Partition-inducing bare plurals
In the last section I argued for expanding the domain of nom to include those indexical bare plurals that meet a reduced bar for intensionality. The fact that such bare plurals show the same scopal behavior as canonical kind denoting bare plurals is no longer surprising. We expect DKP to apply equally to both and yield narrow scope ∃ readings. The question we must now address is the behavior of those indexical bare plurals for which Chierchia's ∃ type shift seemed to capture the scope facts correctly: parts/slices/pieces of NP. Given that ∃ type shift is no longer among the set of covert options, we need an alternative account of the ability of such bare plurals to take scope over other operators.
Drawing on the discussion of part-of in Chierchia (2010), we can take it to be a function from an entity to sets of entities. Extending the account of part to include pieces, slices etc, we can treat all of them as subdividing the entity denoted by the inner NP into non-overlapping i-parts. Their role, roughly speaking, is akin to that of classifiers, in that they create properties that have the appropriate structure for counting. Phrases headed by such partition inducing nouns can therefore serve as arguments for cardinal expressions or determiners, as shown in (26a The question that concerns us here is how to interpret such phrases when there is no cardinal or determiner in the structure. As we know from examples like (26b) they display the scopal properties that ∃ generalized quantifiers have.
In order to address this question, let us consider cardinal phrases which show a similar pattern of behavior. They can be arguments of determiners (27a) or function by themselves as ∃ generalized quantifiers (27b):
(27) a. The three students are standing.
b. Three students are not standing but three are.
A standard view of cardinal expressions in work stemming from Link (1983) is that they are predicate modifiers. This allows them to serve as arguments of determiners. When there is no determiner they are taken to shift to a generalized quantifier meaning by a default ∃ type shift (Landman 2004 , Ionin and Matushansky 2006 , Chierchia 2010 
There remains one final issue to settle. Assuming that cardinal phrases are not in the domain of nom, a derivation like (29a) will be ruled out in languages with determiners due to blocking by the lexical definite. In languages without determiners, however, they are predicted, incorrectly, to be possible under a definite reading due to a covert application of iota, as shown for Hindi in cardinal phrases will all require the lower cardinals to be predicate modifiers in order to avoid a type-clash. The option of utilizing a generalized quantifier meaning will only meet type matching requirements for the cardinal which is the highest expression in the phrase. I have not followed the specifics of Ionin and Matushansky's account of numerals though I consider it correct, since the precise choice of a predicate modifier semantics for cardinals is orthogonal to the point under discussion. The reader is referred to the original article for details. In order to rule out the derivation in (29b), we may consider the primary meaning of cardinals to be that of a generalized quantifier. However, in structures where a predicative meaning is required they shift by a covert application of BE (Partee 1986) . 18 Assuming that such shifts are repair operations, there is no motivation for a predicative meaning for the cardinal expression in a structure like (29b). Without a determiner above, it is predicted that phrases headed by cardinal expressions will necessarily denote generalized quantifiers and show scope interaction with negation and other operators cross-linguistically. Back to indexical bare plurals, I suggest the same holds for partition-inducing expressions like part-of/slices-of, etc.
Some predictions for indexical bare plurals
The proposal I am advancing makes an essential distinction within the class of indexical bare plurals. The first type, those that shift via nom, are predicted to undergo DKP in episodic contexts and display obligatory narrow scope, just like kind denoting bare plurals. The second type, those with partition-inducing head nouns, are predicted to behave like regular indefinites in being able to take scope over other operators. However, there are two properties noted by
Carlson that apply equally to both types of indexical bare plurals. One is the ability to take narrowest scope in contexts where indefinites cannot take such scope, the other is the ability to have de re readings of the sort that kind denoting bare plurals do not have. Since I am aligning one kind of bare plural with kind terms and another with indefinites, these shared properties call for some further discussion. Carlson (1977) b. Max discovered pieces from that puzzle for three hours.
(31) a. #Fred repeatedly destroyed some books I lost yesterday.
b. #Max discovered some pieces from that puzzle for three hours.
Under the present account, (30a) is unproblematic since the bare plural denotes a kind and is subject to DKP. The challenge is to explain (30b). If these bare plurals are like indefinites, (30b) should pattern with the examples in (31), where the generalized existential quantifier takes scope over the adverb and leads to the implausible readings in which the same set of entities is destroyed/discovered multiple times.
So far I have argued that pieces of that puzzle or parts of this machine can have the same semantics as regular indefinites. However, this does not preclude the possibility that they can also be analyzed as simple predicative terms. If so, they would be able to undergo nom as long as they satisfy the presupposition of variation in size. 19 It seems to me that they do. It is possible for there to be different partitions of the same entity at different indices: a puzzle can be made into a 50 piece puzzle in one world and into a 100-piece puzzle in another; a cake can be cut into 6 slices in some world and into 8 slices in another. If so, then it should come as no surprise that they would have the option of aligning with other kind terms in taking lower scope than indefinites that function unambiguously in argument position as generalized quantifiers.
19 Zucchi and White (2001) , in fact, admit to the possibility of treating such noun phrases as kind denoting but do not elaborate on it. See also Lasersohn (1995) , Van Geenhoven (2004) , and more recently, Dayal (2011b) where this phenomenon is discussed at more length.
The second property that the two types of indexical bare plurals have in common is the potential for de re readings. Carlson (1977) notes, albeit somewhat tentatively, that (32a) seems to be ambiguous in the relevant way, while (32b) clearly is not: 20 (32) a. Bill believes that people in the next room are about to leave.
b. Bill believes that people are about to leave.
(32a), under the present account, is predicted to have the interpretation in (33a), after the application of DKP. This can be compared to (33b), the representation of (32b):
believes (s) (b, λs'∃x[ ∪⋂ people(s')(x) & about-to-leave (s')(x)])
I assume that the situation index on a bare plural, shifted via nom, must be identified with the situation index at the lowest point in the tree where one becomes available. In an intensional context, this necessarily yields an opaque reading. An indexical expression inside the bare plural (e.g., next and its logical translation 'next-to-y i '), however, anchors the interpretation of the bare plural to a set of finite entities of whom the attitude holder could potentially have direct 20 An anonymous reviewer asks what the facts would be if in the next room were changed to on Mars in (32a). The judgments are subtle, but briefly put, they turn on whether the extension of the term varies from index to index within a given world (the familiar kind denoting bare plural)
or whether the extension of the term is fixed in a given world to a finite set of entities though allowing for variation across worlds. For present purposes, if it is possible to think of people on Mars in the first sense, it would behave like (32b) in resisting de re readings; if it is possible to think of it in the second sense, it would behave like (32a) in allowing it. I refer the reader to an illuminating discussion of the distinction between kind denoting and indexical readings of alligators in the New York sewer system (Carlson 1977: 197) , and to Dayal (in prep) .
knowledge. This is what I claim is the source of the de re feel of these examples. In other words, the apparent de re reading is a piggy-back effect based on the contextual anchoring provided by the deictic expression. When the bare plural is unmodified or when the modification does not contextually anchor the interpretation, the effect cannot arise. The effect is also unlikely to arise if the anchoring is to a set that is potentially too large for an attitude holder to have direct knowledge of its members. I think the following would not be characterized as allowing a de re construal: b. I didn't read books suggested by you.
(36) a. #I didn't buy books I wanted to buy but I bought books I wanted to buy.
b. #I didn't read books suggested by you but I read books suggested by you.
The data seems a bit puzzling at first glance but I suggest that the wide scope effect we get for (35a) and (35b) is due to the possibility of a contrastive reading. Take a context in which I bought almost all the things I had intended to buy, including perhaps some books that I wanted to buy. I can utter (35a) to convey that among the things that got left out were books I wanted to buy. Similarly, if I read almost everything I was supposed to read including some books suggested by you, I can say (35b) to convey that among the things I didn't read were books suggested by you. This is not exactly a wide scope reading of an ∃ bare plural. It is only bare plurals that can plausibly be analyzed as having partition inducing head nouns that allow for true wide scope, where conjunctions with affirmative and negative counterparts do not result in contradiction. The case of indexical bare plurals that do not countenance conjunction of incompatible predicates but nevertheless seem to allow a ∃¬ reading no doubt merits further attention. But I would like to suggest that the locus of this inquiry should be the role of modification, not the possibility of the ∃ type-shift.
A More radical proposal: DKP modified
In section 4 I made two modifications to Chierchia's system that only affected indexical bare plurals but left untouched his account of kind denoting bare plurals. In this section, I would like to make two further modifications that are somewhat more significant in that they impact on our general understanding of bare plurals. I claim that in episodic statements, the extension of the kind is accessed, i.e. that reference is made to the maximal entity that instantiates the kind at that index. I also argue that the interpretation involves a widened domain, in the sense of Kadmon and Landman (1993) . The so-called ∃ force typically associated with bare plurals in such contexts is re-analyzed as a representative group reading of the maximal entity in the widened domain.
Arguments against ∃-force for kind denoting bare plurals
I start with two facts that argue against the ∃ force associated with bare plurals. I give in each case the logical representation that would be derived under Chierchia's neo-Carlsonian approach as well as under the ambiguity approach. I do this to highlight the fact that the problems are not specific to the neo-Carlsonian position:
(37) a. Dogs, (#namely Spotty and Rover), are barking.
(38) a. #Dogs are barking and dogs are sleeping.
(39) Dogs are barking and dogs are running around.
(37a) shows that the referents of a bare plural cannot be listed. If all that is involved in interpreting bare plurals in episodic contexts is some form of existential quantification over (instances of) dogs, as shown in (37b)-(37c), there is no reason why they should resist specification via a list. The data in (38) is the problem of incompatible predicates we had encountered earlier in connection with indexical bare plurals. As shown in (38b) and (38c), standard approaches do not have a way of accounting for the oddness of (38a). Since there is no issue of scope interaction and each conjunct would normally be acceptable on its own, their conjunction should be as well. Note that switching to compatible predicates has an ameliorating effect, as shown in (39). I should note that it is important in applying this diagnostic to keep the interpretation of both conjuncts fixed to a single spatio-temporal location.
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These facts are replicated cross-linguistically. Consider the following Korean paradigm. 23 In the first case, we have a nominative marked bare nominal, in the second a nominative marked bare nominal with the overt plural morpheme. Both are judged unacceptable:
(40) a. # ai-ka camtul-eiss-ko ai-ka wancenhi kkay-eiss-ta.
child-NOM asleep-be.PROG-and child-NOM completely awake-be.PROG-DECL ('A child is asleep and a child is wide awake.') b. # ai-tul-i camtul-eiss-ko ai-tul-i wancenhi kkay-eiss-ta.
child-PL-NOM asleep-be.PROG-and child-PL-NOM completely awake-be.PROG-DECL ('Children are asleep and children are wide awake.)
Switching to compatible predicates leads to improvement in the basic version and full acceptability in the plural-marked version.
(41) a. ? ai-ka noraeha-ko iss-ko ai-ka chwumchwu-ko iss-ta.
child-NOM sing-CONN be.PROG-and child-NOM dance-CONN be.PROG-DECL 'A child is singing and a child is dancing.'
b. ai-tul-i noraeha-ko iss-ko ai-tul-i chwumchwu-ko iss-ta.
child-PL-NOM sing-CONN be.PROG-and child-PL-NOM dance-CONN be.PROG-DECL 'Children are singing and children are dancing.'
To sum up, specification is resisted in languages with definite articles. In languages without definite articles, specification is possible under a definite reading of the bare plural, but not under an indefinite reading. Bare plurals seem to resist the conjunction of incompatible predicates universally. In addition to English and Korean, I have tested the data in Hindi and Japanese as 22 See Dayal (2004) for a similar diagnostic in the characterization of bare singulars.
23 I thank Hyunjoo Kim for consulting a large number of Korean speakers in eliciting this data.
well. As already shown, these facts are as problematic for the neo-Carlsonian account which always refers to kinds in the interpretation of bare plurals, as they are for the alternative ambiguity based accounts that interpret them as object-level indefinites. Since my focus here is on Chierchia's theory, I will pitch my solution to the problem posed by these facts in relation to the rule of DKP, which is responsible for deriving the existential readings of bare plurals in his theory. However, there are obvious implications for the ambiguity approach as well.
Bare plurals as definites over a widened domain
There are two modifications I will propose to DKP. The first is to remove existential quantification from it, and simply have the sort mismatch between the predicate and the kind term repaired by taking the extension of the kind, i.e. the maximal entity that instantiates the kind at the relevant index (see also Dayal 2011a for discussion of this way of deriving definiteness in Chierchia's system). The second is to require the domain of quantification for a bare plural to be wider (cf. Kadmon and Landman 1993) . (37) and (38) we haven't thrown away the baby with the bathwater. The solution rests on both aspects of the proposed modification: maximality and widening.
Representative group readings
The challenge, in brief, is to reconcile the maximality that clearly helps rule out the conjunction of incompatible predicates with the perception that bare plurals in episodic contexts allow predication to a subset of relevant entities. In order to show that maximality need not be antithetical to our intuitive understanding of bare plurals, I will begin with definite determiners which canonically are thought to encode maximality. An interesting fact about them is that although they refer to maximal entities, they can actually allow a weaker reading in which the predication, strictly speaking, only holds of a subset of the group. It is easy to see this when definites are contrasted with universal terms:
(44) a. Every reporter asked questions at the press conference.
b. The reporters asked questions at the press conference.
In a situation where 3 out of 10 reporters asked questions, (44a) would be false but (44b) may well be accepted. Note that this is independent of the domain restriction for which resource domain variables have been proposed. In both (44a) and (44b) the resource domain variable may restrict the evaluation to reporters at a press conference in the White House on a particular day.
The difference between universals and definites remains unaffected even when the common noun has this restricted interpretation.
This phenomenon, known as representative group readings or pragmatically weakened readings, has been studied by Dowty (1987) , Taub (1989) , Brisson (1998) and Lasersohn (1999) , among others. Lasersohn (1999) discusses these facts within a more general perspective on various items that countenance and regulate such effects. 24 His main point with regard to data such as (44b) is that statements with definites can be evaluated with respect to subsets of the full set of entities, pragmatic halos in his terms, as long as the gap between the halo and the actual denotation is irrelevant in the utterance situation. 24 Lasersohn discusses all, exactly, precisely, as expressions which regulate such weakened readings. See also Brisson (1998) . (46) the speaker signals that the truth of the statement will be verified with respect to a loose halo that refers to a group larger than the contextually salient one. This puts, if you will, empirical bite into the claim of reference to kinds in episodic contexts.
There is an interesting consequence of the account I am proposing. Consider what happens if you utter (49b) when there are no dogs outside. There will not be a halo for ⋂ dogs s' that will make the sentence true, but the term itself will not be undefined because the presupposition of existence can be satisfied on the widened domain. In the case of a plural definite on the other hand, the term itself, ιx [dogs(s)(x)], is undefined. We can capture, without stipulation, a difference between definites and bare plurals by appealing to different domains of quantification for presupposition satisfaction.
Another welcome consequence is that it provides a straightforward account of the problem of incompatible predicates. Consider the following paradigm, due originally to Kroch (1974) : (50) Assume a context in which (50b) will be judged true under a pragmatically weakened reading.
That is, a context in which asleep(the townspeople) is true only of a proper subset of the townspeople. The question is why in (50c) those members who are awake cannot make the second conjunct true. The reason, according to Lasersohn, is that the choice of a halo is context sensitive. If their being awake is relevant enough to justify the assertion in the second conjunct, a halo that leaves those people out cannot be supported to make the assertion in the first conjunct.
The same obviously applies to conjunctions with plural definites. Two conjuncts which have incompatible predicates cannot be remedied by applying the predicates to different halos since a subset that is deemed irrelevant to the truth of the first conjunct cannot then be resurrected as relevant in the next conjunct. In this respect, definites differ from indefinites, whose semantics has predication to subsets built into it and need not rely on halos for the relevant reading:
(51) a. # The reporters asked questions while/but/and the reporters kept quiet.
b. Some reporters asked questions while/but/and some reporters kept quiet.
Under the view that a bare plural is a type of definite, the solution to the problem of incompatible predicates with bare plurals follows from our assumptions about maximality and representative group readings. To go back to our White House press conference scenario, whether the plural individual a+b+c represents the contextually salient set of reporters (for the definite) or reporters more generally (for the bare plural), we cannot predicate kept quiet or did not ask questions in the same context by referring to those that are set aside by the halo deemed appropriate for asked questions. Lasersohn's account, though it incorporates the notion of halos into compositional semantics, leaves to pragmatics the choice of halo appropriate for an assertion. While the semantics proper allows for conjunction of incompatible predicates, the pragmatics of assertion, which regulates the choice of halos, militates against it.
Taking stock
In the previous sections I have presented arguments against having a covert ∃ type shift as well as against the ∃ force introduced by DKP. I have provided alternative explanations for the effects previously attributed to these sources. Instead of ∃ type shift for partition inducing bare plurals, I
have posited a lexical ambiguity where one of the meanings of these phrases is that of the ∃ no dogs or because no dog is barking, there will be no halo of the extension of the kind to make it true. (52c) will be false, so (52a), the negative statement will be true, as desired. But now suppose there is one sole dog barking. In a particular context, that one dog may be enough to make (52c) true and, in that case, (52a) will be false, as desired. But now suppose that the one barking dog for some reason doesn't count as particularly relevant. In such a situation we can ignore that dog and choose a halo without it, making (52c) false and consequently (52a) true.
This last fact goes against the received wisdom about bare plurals and negation but I think it better captures the reality. Consider the White House press conference scenario and assume only one reporter got to ask a question. It may be possible to say in this context either (53a) or (53b), depending on how easy it is for us to treat the sole reporter that asked a question as an outlier:
(53) a. The reporters did not get to ask questions.
b. Reporters did not get to ask questions.
Finally, we might wonder about cases in which the presupposition of existence cannot be met, as shown in (54): (54) I didn't see dinosaurs, because there are no dinosaurs.
What seems to be going on is that the first sentence is uttered in a context where the presupposition that dinosaurs exist is entertained, but is subsequently abandoned (see Chierchia Let us now consider the fact that bare plurals show differentiated scope. These are sentences where they take scope below a temporal adverbial, at a point where indefinites cannot:
(55) a. Leaves kept falling all morning.
There are many issues that come up in relation to such sentences but an intuitively adequate way of characterizing them is to take them as involving quantification over times within a temporal interval. Just to keep things simple, I have taken the quantification to be over sub-situations s of a contextually salient situation S. After the intervention of DKP, we look for a halo of leaves at each s to see if fall can be truthfully predicated of it. Since this is a once-only predicate, we take each sub-situation to license access to a distinct halo for the kind term. This seems reasonable enough but requires further thought when we consider definites in such structures. A variant of (55a) with a definite is also acceptable, as we might expect given the kinship we are claiming between bare plurals and definites. However, we need to be cautious in drawing parallels because the alignment is not perfect.
In contrast to the periphrastic construction, a low pluractional adverbial such as twice yields a more nuanced comparison. With a small time interval like this morning the definite has the implausible reading but with a larger time interval like last year the differentiated scope reading re-emerges:
(56) a. Leaves/ #The leaves fell twice this morning. 
Bare plurals and discourse
Since I have extended the scope of nom and therefore of the modified DKP to indexical bare plurals, we need to see how proper widening plays out in these cases:
(57) a. In 1995, there was a ghost on campus. Students on the campus were afraid.
b.〚afraid(s)( ⋂ (λsλx(students(s)(x) ⋀ on-the-campus(s)(x))))〛 = DKP ⇒ c.〚∃s' [s < s' ⋀ afraid(s)( ⋂ students-on-the-campus s' )〛 Given the restriction imposed by the modifier to a specific time and place, the requirement of proper widening cannot be satisfied if both properties are involved in the comparison. Because of the anchoring to a particular campus at a particular time, the set of students is fixed regardless of how much we widen the domain of quantification. However, because we are dealing with a complex noun phrase, I suggest that it is possible to satisfy widening with reference to the head noun alone. We can see this graphically:
25 See references cited in footnote 19 for relevant discussion about the scope properties of bare nominals and such adverbs. 
The head noun alone satisfies the presupposition of proper widening so widening can technically be satisfied. The implicit (or explicit) restriction by the indexical effectively blocks reference to a plurality beyond the base situation. The "indefinite" feel of the bare plural is predictably missing because the students on campus cannot represent a larger plurality of students on campus. We thus derive Condoravdi's "functional" readings, which align bare plurals with definites rather than indefinites. Note that we needed to block nom from applying to wheels on the car, because if it were admitted as a kind term the same reasoning that we have applied to (57a) would apply to it and yield the unavailable reading.
Continuing further with the general issue of relation to discourse, let us move away from functional contexts to contexts in which there is an explicit antecedent. There are two possibilities to consider: an anaphoric link between the antecedent and the bare plural, and a partitive connection. I repeat English and Hindi (10) In a language like English the bare plural is unacceptable. In a language like Hindi it is acceptable, but only if anaphorically linked to the children in the first sentence. As far as I know, it is not possible for bare plurals to refer to a subset of a previously mentioned set in any language. This follows under the present account since bare plurals are never interpreted with ∃ force, neither through ∃ type shift, nor through DKP. The only possible reading is an anaphoric one, and that is dependent on whether the language has a lexical definite or not. This is, I believe, an important advantage of treating bare plurals as definites.
Proper widening and variation in size
Finally, I would like to consider whether we really need to constrain nom by requiring predicates to vary in size across indices and have a requirement of proper widening when bare plurals are used in object-level statements. In order to do so, I will first look at how predicate selection can affect the felicity of bare plurals. I start by noting some predictions of the view that the indefinite feel of bare plurals is due to representative group readings of a definite, interpreted over a widened domain.
It has been claimed that the choice of predicates can influence the availability of pragmatically weakened readings (see Dowty 1987 , Taub 1989 , Brisson 1998 "What a peaceful day it is. Children are playing happily, children are reading quietly, children are doing their homework. I wish everyday were like this."
An interesting fact about such cases is that there is typically a framing sentence that describes the overall situation, after which follows an elaboration. (62a) most likely follows upon a statement like "There is complete chaos here. People are screaming…" The elaboration seems to pick out sub-situations from a partition of the overall situation. Under these circumstances, it appears possible to use different halos for each sub-situation. In the examples I had used to make the case for bare plurals being definites, the situation was held constant and the judgment was that conjoining incompatible predicates led to contradiction. The point was that holding the situation constant precludes a switch in halos for a bare plural. This would not be an obstacle if the bare plural were an indefinite because an ∃ quantifier could still make reference to different subsets.
In a twist on the same theme, certain infelicitous bare plurals seem to improve when they are part of a list. (63b), due to Omer Preminger (p.c.), contrasts with our previous example, repeated here as (63a):
(63) a. This is a very strong rope. #Fibers are made of nylon.
b. This rope needs to be replaced. Fibers are sticking out and the edges are frayed.
This is a bit of a puzzle but here is how one might try to make sense of it. Suppose, contrary to what we had assumed in section 3, that fibers even in the context of an indexical is a kind term.
Suppose further that in interpreting the phrase fibers are sticking out in (63b), we focus only on a part of the rope, that part where we see some fibers sticking out. Then, we can satisfy proper widening by considering the whole rope which has fibers that are not sticking out. Not only do we get a felicitous bare plural, we also capture the intuition that only some of the fibers in the rope are sticking out. But if we are talking about what those fibers are made of, as in (63a), we look at the whole rope and now proper widening is not possible and the bare plural is ruled out.
The explanation I am giving for (63b) brings us back to the question we had started with: Can an appropriate understanding of how proper widening interacts with predicate selection make it possible to eliminate the constraint of variation in size on kind formation? I am clearly not in a position to answer this question in this paper though the theoretical appeal of such a streamlining is obvious.
Conclusion
I have taken a rather unorthodox view of the core data regarding bare plurals, and by extension, mass terms since the two generally align together. Although I believe I have motivated it on sound empirical grounds, I recognize that further buttressing may be needed to convince the skeptic of the need for such unorthodoxy. In the previous section I indicated some issues that remain open in my mind. It is quite possible that more sophisticated ways of treating discourse
